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Over the last decade, state fragility has become an international policy concern of the donor, security, and peacebuilding communities. Despite different institutional perspectives, the debate over fragile states has reflected an implicit consensus 
in these communities that a strong and functioning state is the instrument to solve the 
challenges of poverty, armed violence, and sustainable development. This consensus has 
marked a significant shift away from the widely-held belief of the 1980s as to the merits of 
market-based solutions to these problems. Instead, ‘statebuilding’ has become somewhat of 
a prescriptive normalcy, as evidenced in the international community’s responses to armed 
violence and insecurity in countries such as Afghanistan, Bosnia Herzegovina, Liberia, 
Haiti, and Iraq. 
In this CCDP Working Paper, Achim Wennmann identifies an increasing gap between 
‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ approaches to building robust state structures. ‘Top-down’ 
statebuilding encompasses most development engagements in fragile states, and is guided 
by a particular set of assumptions related to the composition and structure of national 
and local government, and on the functions the state apparatus should perform. These 
assumptions usually entail a working and accountable bureaucracy, the monopoly over 
the legitimate use of violence, and the capacity to deliver on a series of basic services to 
individuals residing on the state’s territory. Yet in the focus countries themselves, such 
statebuilding efforts are often perceived as an imposition of authority that is only vaguely 
related – if it is related at all – to pre-existing formal or informal governance structures. 
By contrast, the notion of ‘bottom-up’ statebuilding is based on a transitional pact 
between local stakeholders and communities, central governments, and the international 
community, with the aim of nurturing the fusion of traditional, informal, and new state 
components through a progressive transformation process. Such a context-sensitive 
statebuilding strategy focuses more on already established government capacity at the 
municipal and district level, and recognises that informal governance arrangements may 
also provide ‘classic’ state services such as protection, justice, or welfare – sometimes 
even more effectively than the state itself. ‘Bottom-up’ statebuilding, therefore, lies 
between the utopianism of quick-fix solutions advocated by top-down approaches, and the 
impracticalities of a violent, century-long state formation process. The Working Paper thus 
invites us to rethink the way the international community approaches the issue of fragility, 
and explores the opportunities and implications for development agencies to embark on 
more ‘bottom-up’ approaches to statebuilding.
‘Bottom-up’ statebuilding opens a new policy space for aid effectiveness and emphasises 
the importance of identifying the relative strengths of fragile states as a starting point for 
development engagements. The literature review suggests that many contributions focus 
on the weakness of fragile states in terms of institutional capacity, economic performance, 
or state-society relations. Their conceptual starting points prevent a better understanding 
of the political and economic logics of state fragility, one that would also take into 
account pre-existing forms of political authority and social organisation. Adjusting our 
optics on fragile states also connects to an evolving consensus as expressed, for example, 
by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), that statebuilding 
is “an endogenous process to enhance capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state 
driven by state-society relations” (OECD, forthcoming, p.3).
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The paper also highlights a number of knowledge gaps related to enhancing aid 
effectiveness in war-to-peace transitions. Donors often have a comparative advantage 
in facilitating conflict transformation due to their long-time presence in a given region 
or country, their local knowledge, and their developmental expertise. However, many 
potential gains in the effectiveness of aid are lost because donors tend to engage only once 
a peace agreement has been signed. Greater donor involvement at earlier stages of peace
processes could help to positively shape future economic expectations, prepare post-conflict 
recoveries, and ensure that enduring mediation support structures are developed 
that strengthen transitional pacts between local stakeholders in war-to-peace transitions. 
Identifying the added value of current mediation practices for aid effectiveness opens 
a promising policy space for development agencies.
‘Bottom-up’ statebuilding can also be supported through targeted armed violence prevention 
and reduction programming. An increasingly sophisticated evidence base on armed 
violence provides a new vantage point to explore the mechanisms between armed violence 
and development. Better information on the distribution and magnitude of the cost of 
armed violence at the municipal level could also assist in the building of constituencies 
advocating armed violence reduction, as well as the nurturing of local ownership and the 
facilitation of improved state-society relations.
The Working Paper conducts its analysis in three parts. The first part sets out the context 
that made fragile states a development concern and introduces the scope and dilemmas of 
current aid effectiveness initiatives. The second part critically reviews research streams on 
fragile states including various definitions and rankings, case study contributions, as well 
as scholarly work on state formation, the political and economic logics of state fragility, 
and sub-state governance arrangements. The third part distils options for future research 
that relate to the expectations in statebuilding, aid delivery at the sub-state level, aid 
effectiveness in war-to-peace transitions, mediation support infrastructure, and armed 
violence reduction. 
As such, this working paper takes stock of a diverse selection of scholarly and policy 
literatures, and makes a contribution to the evolving discussions on state fragility in 
academia and the donor community. It is part of a larger project supported by the 
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) on development cooperation in 
fragile states and conflict situations. The project proposes new research opportunities 
on the OECD-Development Assistance Committee's (OECD-DAC) initiatives that are 
related to the 2005 Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the 2007 Principles for Good 
International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations.
Christoph Graf  Keith Krause Thania Paffenholz
Head, South Asia Division, SDC Director, CCDP Lead Researcher
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Since its origin after the Second World War, development assistance has occurred in contexts that would today qualify as fragile states or conflict situations.1 However, a unified perspective on the role of the state in facilitating development has only 
recently emerged. For most of its history, the development community has been divided 
about the relationship between the state and the market in society.2 In the 1980s, many 
donors considered development to be a set of technical measures aimed at improving the 
economic performance of developing countries according to economic policy prescriptions. 
This position became associated with the Washington Consensus, which prioritised markets 
over state structures and was believed to represent interventions that were ‘outside the 
realm of political debate’ (Rist, 1997, pp. 78-79).3 
Over the last two decades, however, there has been a shift of attitude towards the state 
in development policy. The state has come to be perceived as a central development 
enabler and, as such, development is increasingly recognised as a political process. 
The United Kingdom’s White Paper on Development, for example, argues that in fragile 
states ‘development cannot be separated from politics and security’ (DFID, 2009a, p. 71). 
This development and security nexus emphasises the need to expand the traditional 
development optic towards conflict resolution, social reconstruction, and statebuilding 
(Duffield, 2002b). A focus on the state also emerged after development economists 
realised that economic growth could not occur without improvements in state policies and 
institutions (Burnside and Dollar, 1997). The 2008 global financial crisis further undermined 
market confidence, and emphasised the urgent need to create a new consensus in which 
state policy and intervention would have a larger role (Mold et al., 2009, pp. 34-35)
The objective of this Working Paper is to review various strands of literature on 
development assistance in fragile states, with the aim of identifying research streams in 
support of initiatives within the OECD-DAC on aid effectiveness. The OECD has become 
the central forum to improve aid effectiveness in fragile states and conflict situations, 
efforts that culminated in the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (hereafter ‘the 
Paris Declaration’) and the 2007 Policy Commitment and Principles for Good International 
Engagement in Fragile States and Situations (hereafter ‘the Principles’). This Working 
Paper adopts a multidisciplinary perspective and draws on qualitative and quantitative 
contributions from the fields of development economics, political science, political 
economy, international relations, history, and new public management, as well as policy 
documents from national and international development agencies. Given the magnitude 
of these literatures, the Paper concentrates on the main issues and perspectives.4 The main 
findings are: 
Most international statebuilding efforts have focused on a ‘top-down’ approach that  W
purposefully imposes a specific state model on fragile states. Much less attention has 
been devoted to ‘bottom-up’ approaches that nurture the fusion of traditional and new 
state components through a progressive transformation process forged by means of 
transition pacts among multiple stakeholders.
The measurement of state fragility has to shift from the assessment of weaknesses to the  W
assessment of strengths. Most fragile state indices measure state fragility according to 
specific benchmarks that tend to emphasise lacking rather than existing capacities. 
A better understanding of the relative strengths of fragile states would assist in 
informing development initiatives on the ground and increasing local ownership. 
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‘Top-down’ statebuilding approaches do not reflect the actual historical record of state  W
formation in Europe. This disconnect emphasises that expectations in statebuilding may 
need to be adjusted, and that by recognising alternative forms of political authority and 
local governance arrangements, new policy spaces are created for donor engagement 
in fragile states.
Fragile states are characterised by fragmented patterns of political authority. While  W
political economy or drivers of change analyses can identify different powerful actors, 
engaging them is often a sensitive issue. The challenge for donors is to find strategies 
that insulate them from the criticism of dealing with these actors, before they undermine 
the donor’s development objectives.
Mediation support activities have a great potential benefit for aid effectiveness. In fragile  W
states, unresolved disputes hinder development yields, and a better understanding of 
mediation support may open new opportunities to prevent and reduce armed violence, 
free-up private sector investments, and strengthen state-society relations. 
The Working Paper conducts its analysis in three parts. The first part reviews the evolution 
of the policy concern with fragile states and introduces the objectives and dilemmas of 
the Paris Declaration and the Principles. The second part charts various research streams 
on fragile states, including various definitions of state fragility, rankings of fragile states, 
case study contributions, historical perspectives on state formation, functionalist approaches 
to governance in developing countries, as well as sub-state governance arrangements as 
alternatives to ‘the state’. The third part distils options for future research and emphasises 
the policy opportunities deriving from the notion of ‘bottom-up’ statebuilding.5 
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Fragile states as 
a development concern
The term ‘fragile state’ has become a common way of characterising all developing countries, even though it relates to a phenomenon that cuts across low, medium and high-income countries.6 ‘Fragility’ usually describes something that is easily broken, 
delicate, or vulnerable. It can manifest itself at the state level through a state’s inability 
to deliver basic services to its citizens (state failure), or the continuous erosion of political 
institutions (state collapse) (Milliken and Krause, 2002). At the societal level, the notion of 
fragility captures the vulnerability and resilience of communities that are exposed to risk 
factors such as armed conflict and violence, disease, and natural disasters (Fabra Mata and 
Ziaja, 2009, p. 5). Weak state-society relations feed fragility by delegitimising the state in the 
eyes of the population, and increasing the society’s vulnerabilities to armed violence and 
disease (OECD, 2008a, p. 16). The following sections review the historical context and 
evolution of the discourse on fragile states and why it has become a major concern for 
development policy. It also introduces the OECD’s Paris Declaration and Principles, and 
analyses their implications for strengthening development prospects in fragile states.
The evolution of the fragile states discourse
The discourse on fragile states emerged as a consequence of four interrelated 
developments: a realisation in the development community that the effect of aid on 
economic growth would be minimal if state policy and institutions in developing countries 
did not change; the experience of weak states as a threat to global stability; United Nations 
peacebuilding activities; and changes in the security agenda after the Cold War. These 
perspectives on fragile states vary in terms of why and in what context the discourse 
emerged; however, their common thread is that they perceive the state – and not the 
market – as the instrument to solve a problem. For some, this problem was poverty and 
armed conflict, for others it was the insecurity of states or people. 
In the mid-1990s, many development agencies recognised that the effect of aid on economic 
growth and poverty reduction was greater in countries with ‘good’ policies and institutions 
(Burnside and Dollar, 1997, p. 33; Burnside and Dollar, 1998, p. 15).7 Japan’s state-led 
development approach, and the restructuring of the economies of Eastern Europe, also 
emphasised that the state can be an important development catalyst (Wade, 1996; Amsden 
et al., 1994). These insights connected to a pre-existing discourse in the social sciences 
associated with Theda Skocpol’s work on ‘bringing the state back in’, which fostered 
discussions on the capacity of states, their strengths and weaknesses, and their role as 
development catalysers (Skocpol, 1985; Migdal, 1988). They also invited a rethinking of 
the Washington Consensus and devoted greater attention to ‘the institutional dimensions 
[and] the sort of policies (…) that promote an equitable distribution of income as well as 
a rapid growth of income’ (Williamson, 2000, p. 262). State institutions became strategic 
opportunities to make aid more effective, with some arguing that the poverty reduction 
impact of aid could in fact be doubled (Collier and Dollar, 2002, p. 1475). New initiatives 
emerged that focused on donor coordination, absorptive capacities of recipient countries, 
and optimal sequencing of interventions (McGillivray, 2005, p. ii). 
The fragile state also became a policy concern because of the growing perception that the 
absence or weakness of a state could be a threat to economic stability. The Asian financial 
crises of 1997 and 1998 exposed the risks of global economic integration and the 
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vulnerability of emerging economies. The crisis was explained by weak and corrupt 
governance, as well as financial liberalisation without the appropriate regulatory framework 
(Wade, 1998, p. 1535). The crisis, therefore, underlined the need to increase the economic 
governance and resilience capacity of states to harness the opportunities of globalisation. 
A similar rationale was used in relation to the spread of infectious diseases, uncontrolled 
migration, and climate change (Wesley, 2008, p. 372). 
With the events of 11 September 2001, fragile states also became a crucial security threat 
(Patrick, 2007). As noted by the 2006 National Security Strategy of the United States of 
America (USA): ‘Weak and impoverished states and ungoverned areas are not only a threat 
to their people and a burden on regional economies, but are also susceptible to exploitation 
by terrorists, tyrants, and international criminals’ (PUSA, 2006, p. 33). In a sense, managing 
fragile states had become ‘vital to international security’ and statebuilding was ‘central to 
the future of world order’ (Fukujama, 2004, pp.162-163). The perception of fragile states as a 
security threat remains popular even though scholarly research has exposed its limitations 
(Hehir, 2007).8 In Latin America, the fragile states-security linkage has also been used by 
politicians in order to attract the attention of the USA, and justify requests for development 
and military assistance as exemplified by the Plan Colombia (Serrano, 2008, p. 2).
Fragile states also emerged in the context of United Nations peacebuilding activities. 
As part of the 1992 Agenda for Peace, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali delineated 
activities around preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacekeeping, and added a 
fourth dimension on post-conflict peacebuilding as an ‘action to identify and support 
structures which tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid the relapse into 
conflict’ (UNGA, 1992, para.21).9 This understanding of peacebuilding emphasised the need 
to consolidate peace after war, and prevent renewed conflict, thus encompassing both 
remedial and preventive purposes (Paris and Sisk, 2009b, p. 5). The notion of peacebuilding 
does not just mean the elimination of armed conflict, but also the achievement of a 
‘positive’ peace,10 the creation of non-violent behaviour patterns and attitudes, as well as 
the transformation of the structures of conflict – the institutions, actors, issues, and 
discourses that are held to reproduce armed violence (Barnett et a., 2007, pp. 37, 42). 
Gradually, peacebuilding was associated with a democratic state, a liberal market economy, 
and the rule of law, as well as to activities that would promote the respect for human 
rights, multi-party elections, and good governance norms while reducing military 
expenditure (Paris, 2002, p. 638). These state attributes were also held to define a new 
type of political conditionality of international engagement in fragile or conflict states 
(Uvin and Biagiotti, 1996, p. 377).
In addition, the fragile states discourse was related to the broadening and deepening of the 
security agenda after the cold war (Buzan, 1991; Krause and Williams, 1997). Rather than 
just focusing on the security of the state, emphasis was placed on the factors and conditions 
that determine the people’s experience of insecurity and violence. Such a perspective 
stressed a state’s functional capacity to deliver security, welfare and representation 
(Krause and Jütersonke, 2005). The role of the state was also emphasised after a series 
of human tragedies in the mid-1990 – especially Rwanda and Bosnia – resulted in the 
development of the notion of a ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P), whereby states were 
called upon to protect their citizens against genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and 
crimes against humanity (ICISS, 2001). Ensuing debates questioned if R2P provides a new 
basis for an international ‘obligation’ to intervene if states failed to deliver basic protective 
functions (Jütersonke, 2006. p. 13; Bellamy, 2008, p. 135). 
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Aid and armed conflict
Fragile states also became a development concern through the recognition of a greater 
linkage between development and armed conflict. The end of the cold war changed the 
status of a number of peripheral territories from strategic interests to potentially dangerous 
places. Development became increasingly related to security concerns because armed 
conflict and crime were perceived to occur predominantly in developing and rapidly 
urbanising countries (Burr et al, 2007, 9). In this context, development did not just mean 
improving long term economic conditions and opportunities, but also ‘attempting to 
transform societies as a whole, reconstructing social relations anew, and especially, 
changing behaviour and attitudes. Rather than building physical things or redistributing 
material resources, development now means getting inside the head to govern the hand’ 
(Duffield, 2002a, pp. 1066-1067). 
Armed conflict was understood by many policy-makers and development agencies as 
a social regression or ‘black box’ that interrupted a linear process of development. 
It was portrayed as ‘development in reverse’, trapping countries into recurring cycles of 
poverty and violence. Presenting armed conflict as an economic pathology justified an 
interventionist agenda, and the need for post-conflict aid, peace operations, security 
guarantees, and caps on military spending (Collier et al, 2003, p. 32; Collier et al, 2008). 
However, these accounts of armed conflict did not recognise the social and economic 
transformations also taking place during armed conflict (Cramer, 2006, p. 197). In many 
situations, armed violence was used to further economic ends, and represented ‘not simply 
a breakdown of a particular system, but a way of creating an alternative system of profit, 
power and even protection’ (Keen, 1998. p. 11). 
Development agencies found themselves increasingly exposed to these situations. 
They became involved in complex humanitarian emergencies, 11 and became ‘trapped’ in 
countries – such as Rwanda and Nepal – that slipped into conflict despite a long record of 
development assistance (Paffenholz, 2006a, p. 8; Väyrynen, 2000, p. 49). The experience of 
these engagements showed that aid had specific functions that did not necessarily support 
humanitarian or development prerogatives (Keen, 2008, p. 116). Aid was found to affect 
local resource transfers and disputes over resource distribution. It also financed armed 
groups, legitimised belligerent factions, and entrenched conflict economies (Paffenholz, 
2006b, pp. 28-29). The lesson was, therefore, that ‘when international assistance is given in 
the context of a violent conflict, it becomes part of this context, and thus also of the conflict’ 
(Anderson 1999, p. 1). 
The recognition of such wide-ranging consequences of aid shaped a series of strategic 
concerns on conflict-sensitive development engagements. For example, donors follow the 
‘do no harm’ principle when disengaging from conflict countries, staying on, or facing those 
within their jurisdiction that are responsible for an armed conflict (OECD, 2007a, pp. 6-7). 
Donors also explored the ways in which they could work around, in, or on the armed 
conflict. They could work around a conflict by withdrawing or suspending aid or structural 
adjustment programmes. Such actions would reduce their role to watching from outside and 
reengaging at the cessation of conflict. Donors could work in a conflict situation out of 
recognition that it is at this time that poverty and human suffering is most severe and 
aid therefore most needed. Some donors worked on the conflict to resolve an existing 
conflict and prevent future ones, thereby removing a principal development impediment 
(Goodhand, 2001, pp. 30-31). In cases where development actors remain on the ground 
during a conflict, they often need to maintain a sensitive balance between humanitarian 
and development mandates, both of which may be conducted at the same time depending 
on the spatial distribution of armed violence and its effects (Paffenholz, 2006b, p. 22).
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The Paris Declaration and the Principles
The changing historical context after the Cold War and the experience of donors in conflict 
situations shaped efforts to rethink their possible new roles in a changing world. The OECD 
formalised such endeavours over the last decade as it established guidelines for the role of 
aid in conflict prevention and in transitional, conflict, and post-conflict situations (OECD, 1998, 
p. 7-8; OECD, 2001). It also focused on donor guidance on topics such as security sector 
reform (SSR), anti-corruption, justice and security delivery, and armed violence reduction 
(OECD 2007b; OECD 2007b; OECD, 2007d; OECD, 2009). Governments were also called upon 
to structure their development assistance along ‘whole-of-government’ approaches. These 
approaches implied the coordination of policy inputs across various government departments 
dealing with fragile or conflict countries, with the aim of increasing cost effectiveness and 
legitimacy, and strengthening implementation (OECD, 2006, p. 18). 
The efforts to enhance coordination between states culminated in the 2005 Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the 2007 Policy Commitment and Principles for 
Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations (see Table 1). The Paris 
Declaration is an action-oriented roadmap aimed at improving the effectiveness of 
development aid. Its spirit is described by strengthening efforts to increase the ownership 
of partner countries over their development policies; to align donor strategies to partner 
countries’ national development strategies; to harmonise the actions of development 
agencies; to strengthen decision-making for results; and to ensure mutual accountability 
(OECD, 2005, p. 1). The 2007 Principles entail ten guidelines on how donors should engage 
in fragile states. Both the Paris Declaration and the Principles have an inward-looking 
character in that they are primarily targeted at the development community itself and 
explore specifically how the impact of this community can be improved. Concerns focus on 
the harmonisation of activities in partner countries across development agencies and the 
improvement of development results. One recommendation is to yield greater control 
of development processes to partner countries in order to increase national ownership.
Table 1: Key aspects of the 2005 Paris Declaration and 2007 Principles
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005)
Principles for Good International Engagement 
in Fragile States and Situations (2007)
Ownership: Developing countries set their own strategies 
for poverty reduction, improve their institutions and 
tackle corruption.
Alignment: Donor countries align behind these objectives 
and use local systems.
Harmonisation: Donor countries coordinate, simplify 
procedures and share information to avoid duplication.
Results: Developing countries and donors shift focus 
to development results and results get measured.
Mutual Accountability: Donors and partners are 
accountable for development results.
1. Take context as the starting point.
2. Ensure all activities do no harm.
3. Focus on statebuilding as the central objective.
4. Prioritise prevention.
5. Recognise the links between political, security and 
development objectives.
6. Promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive 
and stable societies.
7. Align with local priorities in different ways and 
in different contexts.
8. Agree on practical co-ordination mechanisms 
between international actors.
9. Act fast… but stay engaged long enough to 
give success a chance.
10. Avoid pockets of exclusion (‘aid orphans’).
Sources: OECD, 2005; OECD, 2007a.
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The Accra Third High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2008 took stock of the 
implementation record of the Paris Declaration. The Accra Agenda for Action recognised 
that ‘we are making progress, but not enough’ and key recommendation included increasing 
country ownership, building more effective and inclusive partnerships, as well as achieving 
and accounting for development results (OECD 2008d, p. 1; OECD 2008c, pp. 14-16). 
Ongoing activities focus on monitoring and periodic reports that are intended to foster 
state compliance with the Paris Declaration and the Principles. Concerning the monitoring 
of the Paris Declaration, the OECD has developed a series of progress indicators along 
the principles of ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results, and mutual 
accountability (OECD, 2005). In 2006, the OECD conducted a cross-country baseline 
assessment that was followed by a second expanded survey of progress on implementing 
the Paris Declaration in 54 countries (OECD, 2006b; OECD, 2008c). 
With regards to the Principles, findings from the 2009 Principles Monitoring Survey 
Report highlight good, moderate, or improving results for most of the Principles with mixed 
results for Principle 1 (taking context as a starting point), and weak results for Principle 10 
(avoiding pockets of exclusion). Based on national consultations in Afghanistan, the Central 
African Republic, DRC, Haiti, Sierra Leone, and Timor-Leste, the monitoring illustrates 
the work ahead on issues such as defining and resourcing the analytical efforts required 
for context-sensitive programming, overcoming the fragmentation of donor activities and 
parallel implementation structures, increasing the coverage of crisis prevention efforts, 
and redressing the imbalance of aid between and within countries (OECD, 2010).
In support of the Paris Declaration and the Principles, recent efforts have shifted towards a 
coherent, coordinated and complementary – the ‘3C’ – approach across security, diplomacy, 
aid, and finance in situations of conflict and fragility. Here, the idea is that 3C builds on 
the common requirements of whole-of-government and whole-of-system approaches in a 
combined effort to focus on the required results, rather than on questions of mandate, 
resources and leadership (SDC, 2009, p. 8).
Implementation dilemmas
The interrelated issues of aid effectiveness and fragile states have become a principle policy 
theme for the development community, and donor countries have been shaping their 
development strategies accordingly (UNDESA and UNDP, 2007; BMZ, 2007a; USAID, 2005; 
DFID, 2005; DFID, 2009c). The United Kingdom’s White Paper on Development exemplifies 
how much development practice has changed from technical market interventions to 
addressing development as an inherently political challenge: 
The best way to stem the rise of violence and create a platform for sustained growth 
is to build a state that is capable of delivering basic services effectively and fairly, and 
is accountable and responsive to its citizens. It also requires working more politically. 
Conflict and fragility are inherently political. They are about how power and 
resources are shared in society, between ethnic groups, social classes or men and 
women. Their solutions must be rooted in politics (DFID, 2009a, p. 70).
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These new directions of development policy, however, also mean new practical challenges. 
The pursuit of aid effectiveness ‘is premised on the assumption that a government is 
willing and able to lead and is perceived as legitimate by its citizens’ (OECD, 2009, p. 23). 
Yet in situations of armed conflict or authoritarian rule, such willingness and ability is 
not always given. In these circumstances, there is little – if any – dialogue between 
donors and the government, and the implementation of the Paris Declaration is limited 
(OPM and IDL, 2008, p. vi). Finding ways of dealing with governments that are unwilling 
to implement development-oriented transformations is therefore a crucial challenge 
for donors.12
Moreover, the perception of development as politics and the focus of the Paris Declaration 
on changing a country’s political system may ultimately be self-defeating in terms of 
strengthening development outcomes. If the aid effectiveness agenda is increasingly 
perceived as an agenda for engineering political change, it is unlikely to provide an 
incentive for commitment from many governments. As a consequence, the Paris 
Declaration may be perceived as yet another attempt by the international community to 
intervene in developing countries, even if such efforts are well intended (Booth, 2008, p. 1).
In addition, if political changes were really influencing the trajectory of development 
outcomes, most donors would be ill-suited to advance this goal because their prevailing 
attitude is one of risk avoidance and political correctness. A study of Irish Aid concluded: 
Risk-aversion and illusions of control are leading even progressive donors to adopt 
practices – within sector programmes and budget support – that are at variance with 
the policies they espouse. (…) The fact that political ‘realities’ in the donor country 
make this behaviour hard to avoid does not seem a sufficient reason for not doing 
what is right. A thinking and learning organisation would set itself the goal of 
managing these constraints, rather than tamely accepting them (ABIA, 2008, p. 48).
Thus, if the Paris Declaration shifts development practice towards reforming political 
systems, its full development gains could remain unfulfilled unless donors take risks, and 
go beyond their current preoccupation about disbursement conditions and aid allocation 
(ABIA, 2008, p. 49).
Another dilemma of the Paris Declaration is its ambition to reduce poverty and increase 
aid effectiveness without tackling armed violence. There is an increasing recognition that 
armed violence undermines development and prevents achievement of the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) (Steward, 2003, p. 325; Turner et al, 2005). Armed violence 
imposes tremendous human, social, and economic costs, and destroys development 
opportunities. Understanding armed violence in fragile contexts is therefore imperative to 
achieving the goals of the Paris Declaration. Recent work undertaken by the OECD and the 
Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development has begun to address this gap, 
emphasising the need for a bottom-up understanding of people’s insecurity and the related 
linkage to state institutions and development (OECD, 2009; Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 
2008; Miller and Rudnik, 2008). In this view, a crucial element for shifting a state from 
fragility to resilience is a better understanding not that the state has failed, but clarifying 
the indicators that establish whom the state is failing, where, how, and why.13 
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Since the Paris Declaration and the Principles have been adopted in 2005 and 2007 respectively, 
other guidelines have also emerged. In 2008, World Bank President Robert Zoellick presented 
principles with a slightly different priority setting and provided an alternative reference for 
structuring development assistance in fragile states. The World Bank and OECD principles 
overlap on national ownership, donor coordination, local context, and long-term donor 
commitment. The World Bank, however, is more explicit on the need to tackle security in 
order to ensure development, engage the private sector, and recognise political economy 
constraints on development (Zoellick, 2008a, pp. 74-75, 77-78). The World Bank principles 
are particularly different in relation to armed violence. Zoellick emphasised the importance 
of shifting beyond classic development or conflict thinking towards ‘securing development’ 
– a notion that entails ‘bringing security and development together first to smoothen the 
transition from conflict to peace, [and] then to ensure stability so that development can take 
hold over a decade and beyond’ (Zoellick, 2008b, p. 11). In this way, the World Bank 
principles connect to the growing recognition that ending conflict, building peace, and 
achieving development are interconnected (UNDP, 2008, xix-xx; ILO, 2008; de Soto and 
del Castillo, 1994, p. 76). 
In order to strengthen war-to-peace transitions and development it is, therefore, important to 
go beyond an operational division that separates conflict from post-conflict phases, and shift 
policy towards systems approaches that increase aid effectiveness through improving the 
coherence, coordination, and complementarity of interventions. In some cases, such as the 
DRC and Afghanistan, increasing aid effectiveness also means adopting a regional approach 
and recognising the inherent interconnectedness of conflict and fragility across borders.
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Research inventory on fragile states
In the broadest sense, perspectives on ‘fragile states’ can be distinguished in two ways (Di John 2008, pp. 2-3, 30-31). The first emphasises the role of markets and their needs for transparent and accountable states as a necessary input for economic development, 
a development that is limited in developing countries through the existence of corrupt and 
patrimonial state structures. State fragility is a deviation from an ideal type that is usually 
associated with a functioning bureaucracy, the monopoly over the legitimate use of force, 
and the capacity to deliver a series of basic services to the populations living within it. 
From this perspective, efforts to address the failings of the state focus on a ‘top-down’ 
implementation of a specific state model.
The other perspective considers client and patrimonial states as purposefully constructed 
entities. These serve local elites or foreign interests and strengthen monopolised capital 
accumulation and the maintenance of political power. This view exposes the formal 
measurement of state fragility, because it fails to conceptualise state weakness as a strategy to 
manage resources, territory, people, and power. It also places armed violence in the context 
of social transformation, and the historical conditions of state formation, and recognises 
alternatives to a specific state model. These involve traditional figures of authority, or 
strongmen, that are perceived by local populations as a legitimate authority (Rodgers, 2006, 
pp. 316-318). 
The following section charts the main research streams on fragile states. These are located 
between the two perspectives just considered. It analyses various definitions characterising 
the fragile state as a deviation from a Weberian model centred around the state as the 
legitimate holder of the monopoly of violence. The next sections then look at various 
ranking exercises as a basis for development planning, and chart an ever-increasing pool 
of qualitative country case studies. The reader is then invited to rethink the prevailing 
orthodoxy associated with the Weberian state by exploring the record of state formation 
in Europe and reflecting on the historical success and failures of states. The final section 
explores the importance of the political and economic logics of state fragility for the 
governance of developing countries, as well as various governance arrangements at the 
sub-state level as alternatives to ‘the state’. 
Overall, this part of the Working Paper highlights that most international efforts have 
focused on a ‘top-down’ approach that purposefully imposes a specific state model on fragile 
states. Much less attention has focused on a ‘bottom-up’ approach that nurtures the fusion 
of traditional and new state components. The Annex provides an overview of the various 
research centres and government departments that have made contributions to the fragile 
states debate.




Most definitions tend to describe fragile states in relation to some ideal notion of 
‘the state’. This model is usually understood as connecting the historical experience of 
the European state with Max Weber’s classic definition: ‘a compulsory political organisation 
with continuous operations will be called a “state” insofar as its administrative staff 
successfully upholds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in 
the enforcement of order’ (see Hay and Lister, 2006, p. 8). State institutions manage state 
affairs and are distinct from civil society. They have their own interests, preferences and 
capacities. Weber’s definition has been the reason for the emphasis on the legitimacy of 
force used to constrain populations, state strategies to construct and sustain the use of force, 
the balance between coercion and consent of societies, and the mechanisms by which 
legitimacy can be established (Hay and Lister 2006, pp. 8-9).
Many contemporary definitions of the ‘fragile’ state highlight the continuous relevance of 
Weber’s characterisation of the state (see Table 2). Donor definitions underline that fragility 
is a function of the measurable absence of state attributes (institutions) and the delivery of 
state functions (security, welfare, justice and representation). Hence, they capture the 
inherent weakness of fragile states.
Table 2: Selected donor definitions of fragile states
BMZ Fragile statehood exists in situations where there is low level of government performance, 
where state institutions are weak or on the verge of collapse and where the state either fails 
to perform core roles or performs them wholly inadequately.




Fragility refers to weak or failing structures and to situations where the social contract is broken 
due to the State’s incapacity or unwillingness to deal with its basic functions, meets its obligations 
and responsibilities regarding service delivery, management of resources, rule of law, equitable 
access to power, security and safety of the populace and protection and promotion of citizens’ rights 
and freedoms.
OECD States are fragile when state structures lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic 
functions needed for poverty reduction, development, and to safeguard the security and human 
rights of their populations.
SDC A state or context is describe as fragile if a significant proportion of the population does not regard 
the state as the legitimate framework for the exercise of power, if the state does not or cannot 
exercise its monopoly of the legitimate use of force within its territory, and if the state is unable 
or unwilling to provide basic goods and services to a significant part of the population.
USAID Fragile states refer to a broad range of failing, failed, and recovering states that are unable or 
unwilling to adequately assure the provision of security and basic services to significant portion 
of their populations and where the legitimacy of the governments is in question.
World Bank Low Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) are vulnerable in their capacity to deliver services to 
their citizens, to control corruption, or to provide for sufficient voice and accountability.
Sources: BMZ, 2007a, p. 13; DFID, 2005, p. 7; European Union, 2007, p. 5; OECD, 2007a, p.7, FDFA, 2007, p. 47; 
USAID, 2005, p. 1; World Bank, 2005a, 1.
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Most of these definitions highlight that fragile states are characterised by a lack of will 
and capacity to deliver core state functions. DFID’s definition focuses on the provision 
of entitlements in the context of poverty reduction and distinguishes between capacity 
and willingness. This definition leads to four categories of countries, including the 
‘good performers’, the ‘weak but willing’, the ‘strong but unresponsive’, and the ‘weak-
weak states’ – the latter having neither capacity nor willingness to reduce poverty (DFID, 
2005, p. 8). USAID emphasises that there is no predictable path of failure and recovery 
and that ‘it is more important to understand how far and quickly a country is moving 
from or toward stability than it is to categorise a state as failed or not’ (USAID, 2005, p. 1). 
While the World Bank tends to understand fragility as an economic problem, the European 
Union emphasises the need for a social contract between state and society. Despite these 
variations, donor definitions seem to have a tendency to measure state fragility against 
an ideal type state that in turn becomes the basis for the ranking of fragile states.
Ranking fragile states
The assumption of an ideal type state as a benchmark is the quintessential requirement to 
measurement techniques (Migdal, 1988, p. 19). Depending on their score, states are then 
categorised as ‘strong’ or ‘weak’, ‘robust’ or ‘fragile’, or ‘successful’ or ‘failing’ (Bøås and 
Jennings, 2005, p. 388). In these rankings, western democracies often represent strong, 
robust and successful states – and have therefore become a ‘prescriptive normalcy’ – 
while those that deviate are labelled weak, fragile, or failing (Dornboos, 2002, p. 808; 
Rotberg, 2004, p. 1). 
Indicators for state fragility orient themselves mainly according to the lack of a state’s capacity 
to maintain ‘empirical’ – as opposed to ‘juridical’ – statehood and fulfil certain state functions 
(Krause and Jütersonke, 2007, p. 5).14 Indicators to measure this ‘stateness’ include, for example, 
the minimum requirements for a state set out by the 1933 Montevideo Convention: a permanent 
population, a defined territory, a government; and the capacity to enter into relations with 
the other states (Malanczuk, 1997, pp. 75-76). Others have also described these indicators as 
including the rule of law, the monopoly on the legitimate use of force, administrative control, 
management of public finances, investment in human capital, the creation of citizenship 
rights and duties, the provision of infrastructure services, the formation of markets, and the 
management of public asset (Ghani and Lockhart, 2008, pp. 124-166; Holsti, 1996, 104-108). 
In recent years, the measurement of state fragility has become a popular research venture 
(see Table 3).15 Underlying the numerous ranking exercises is the idea that fragility can 
be rated according to what functions the state is not delivering on. Thus, the severity of 
failure is related to a hierarchy of political goods including security, dispute settlement, 
participation, and social service delivery (Rotberg, 2004, pp. 3-5). The identification of state 
fragility can also occur via a three-way process that identifies the relevant configurational 
and composite variables; postulates thresholds to identify transformations and shifts from 
states of equilibriums; and determines the independence of variables to isolate their causal 
significance (Carment, 2004, p. 138). Current state fragility indices draw indicators and 
data sources from 41 categories (Fabra Mata and Ziaja, 2009, p. 81).
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The BTI is a larger index that measures transformation processes 
towards democracy and market economy. It uses expert surveys entailing 
52 questions and 17 indicators. Two of the questions relate to state 
weakness and address coverage of the monopoly of the use of force over 







The CIFP draws on country-level structural indicators to develop effective 
policies to respond to intrastate conflict. It departs from three fundamental 
state properties: authority, legitimacy, and capacity. These properties are 
then measured for 192 countries through range of 74 indicators covering the 
spheres of governance, economics, security and crime, human development, 
demography, the environment, and one cross-cutting theme: gender 
Carment et al., 




The FSI tracks the risk of state failure using the Conflict Assessment System 
Tool (CAST) developed as a methodology for early warning and assessment 
of internal conflict (FFP, 2009). The FSI ranks 177 countries based on 
indicators that proxy demographic pressures, complex humanitarian crises, 
group grievances, human flight, uneven development, economic growth and 
decline, state legitimacy, public services, rule of law and human rights, 





The PCIL ranks 160 countries according to their risk of future state instability. 
It uses a combination of publicly available statistics and includes indicators 
on regime consistency, infant mortality, economic openness, militarisation, 
and neighbourhood wars.
Hewitt et al., 2009
State Fragility 
Index (SFI)
The SFI ranks 162 developed and developing countries in terms of 
effectiveness and legitimacy across four dimensions of state functions 
(economic development, governance, security, and social development), 
using a variety of indicators in these fields. The objective is to assess 
the system performance of states.
Marshall and 
Goldstone, 2008
Index of State 
Weakness (ISW)
The ISW ranks 141 developing countries according to their relative 
performance in the economic, political, security, and social sphere. 
It is structured along 20 indicators. 
Rice and Patrick, 
2008
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Table 4: Top ten state fragility rankings compared, 2007
Ranking CIFP 2007 FSI 2007 CGSF 2007 ISW 2007
1 Myanmar Sudan DRC Somalia
2 Afghanistan Iraq Afghanistan Afghanistan
3 Sudan Somalia Sierra Leone DRC
4 Iraq Zimbabwe Somalia Iraq
5 DRC Chad Chad Burundi
6 Somalia Côte d’Ivoire Myanmar Sudan
7 Liberia DRC Sudan CAR
8 North Korea Afghanistan Burundi Zimbabwe
9 Turkmenistan Guinea Côte d’Ivoire Liberia
10 Burundi CAR Ethiopia Côte d’Ivoire
Source: Rice and Patrick, 2008, p. 39; Marshall and Goldstone, 2007, p. 15; FSI, 2008. Available online at 
http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/app/ gdp_ranking.php?order=Average, accessed 3 April 2009. 
The BTI and PCIL do not cover the year 2007.
The measuring of state fragility has not been without its critics. As the various projects listed 
above suggest, they have often been conceived for different purposes and use a different set 
of indicators and ranking methods that measure different things, produce different results, 
and are therefore not really comparable (Carment et al., 2007, p. 15). A comparison of the 
top ten fragile states in four indices presents a different mix of countries (see Table 4). These 
indices can thus hardly provide a basis for defining the strategic priorities for development 
interventions, and generally need to respond to the challenge that impressionistic descriptions 
of state fragility may be a better classificatory tools than cross-country indices (Gutiérrez Sanin, 
2009, p. 2). Nevertheless, the potential of rankings as a policy instrument may improve if 
they produce comparable series of measurement over time, triangulating the results with 
qualitative and contextual analysis (Krause and Jütersonke, 2007, p. 11).
Moreover, indices provide only a retrospective picture of state fragility because they use 
data that capture past events or conditions. It is therefore questionable if they are able to 
capture the dynamic elements of fragility and identify policy recommendations for future 
action. Indices only establish correlations and do not provide answers to the cause of 
fragility. They are also largely unable to capture the mechanisms and actors involved in 
the process of making states fragile, even though this would be of primary importance for 
practitioners confronting state fragility (Krause and Jütersonke, 2007, p. 10; Carment et al., 
2007, p. 14). The distinctions between the various spheres that are measured – such as 
authority, capacity, and legitimacy – often break down if translated into a practical context 
(Rice and Patrick, 2008, p. 6).
Given the prevalence of national level indicators of the rankings, it is also difficult to assess 
the sub-national dimensions of fragility. For example, states are said to have a ‘responsibility 
to protect’ their citizens against genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against 
humanity (ICISS, 2001). The tendency for national level indicators, however, does not allow 
identification of sub-national variations and trends in relation to the provision of security, 
welfare and representation. In terms of human security, therefore, assessments of fragile 
states should less be concerned with how states compare to some fictitious ideal of the state 
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but rather in relation to ‘a state’s ability or willingness to function in a manner conducive 
to the welfare of the majority of the citizens’ thus asking ‘for whom is the state failing and 
how’ rather than these states are failing and why (Bøås and Jennings 2005, p. 386; see also 
Woodward, 2006, p. 6). Thus, fragile states indices have a tendency to focus on what is 
missing rather than existing state strengths. Shifting current indices from weakness to 
strength assessments could make an important contribution to informing development 
programmes on the ground.
Case study literature
The last few years have also seen a proliferation of case studies on fragile states. These 
studies provide a qualitative and context-sensitive analysis of state fragility of specific cases, 
and thus contrast the cross-country statistical work discussed previously. 
The Crisis States Research Centre (CSRC) of the London School of Economics, for example, 
produced a series entitled Analytical Narrative on State-Making that includes case studies 
on Afghanistan (Giustozzi, 2008), Colombia (Sanín et al., 2007), the DRC (Hesselbein, 2007), 
Mozambique (Sumich and Honwana, 2007), Rwanda (Goloba-Mutebi, 2008b), Tajikistan 
(Matveeva, 2009), and Uganda (Goloba-Mutebi, 2008a). The CSRC has an additional series 
on Cities and Fragile States that takes the analysis of state fragility to the sub-national level 
and includes contributions on Maputo (Sumich, 2007), Dar es Salaam and Kampala 
(Bryceson, 2008), Gulu (Branch, 2008), Managua (Rodgers, 2008), Kabul (Esser, 2009); 
Dili (Moxham, 2008), and Bogotá, Medellín, and Cali (Sanín et al., 2009). 
The Centre for the Future State of the Institute of Development Studies in Brighton 
structured its analyses around various themes related to the functions of the state, and their 
implications for development assistance. The six themes include aid and the international 
dimension of governance; collective action and political representation; public action and 
private investment; public service delivery; state capacity; and tax revenue and public 
finance. Case study volumes drawing on this research exist on state reform and social 
accountability (Brazil, India, and Mexico) (Houtzager et al., 2008), and on taxation and 
statebuilding (Brätigam et al., 2008). There are case study references in most conceptual 
work, including one of the main reports of the project entitled Signposts to More Effective 
States (Centre for the Future State, 2005).
The scholarly community has also produced a number of case study volumes that explore 
various perspectives on fragile states. Examples include collected case studies on state 
collapse and state failure (Zartman, 1995; Rotberg, 2003; Chesterman et al., 2005), on 
statebuilding (Call and Wyeth, 2008; Paris and Sisk, 2009), and economic policies and 
statebuilding (Boyce and O’Donnell, 2007b; Bräutigam et al., 2008). There are also various 
special issues of academic journals that include case studies on specific countries or 
contexts (see Table 5).
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Table 5: Special issues of academic journals on state fragility
Topic Journal Lead or introductory article
State collapse, state failure, and state 
reconstruction
Development and Change (Vol.33, No.5) Milliken and Krause, (2002)
Rebuilding governance in fragile states and 
post-conflict societies
Public Administration and Development 
(Vol.25, No.1)
Brinkerhoff (2005)
Insecurity and development European Journal of Development 
Research, (Vol. 17, No. 3)
Biekart et al. (2005)
Globalization, liberalization, and prospects 
for the state
International Political Science Review, 
Vol. 26, No.1
Putzel (2005)
Nation- and state-building Third World Quarterly (Vol.27, No.1) Berger (2006)
Failed states Conflict Management and Peace Science 
(Vol. 25, No. 2)
Starr (2008)
Urban Insecurities Security Dialogue (Vol. 40, No. 4-5) Jütersonke et al. (2009)
Challenging the Weberian state: armed 
groups and contemporary conflicts
Contemporary Security Policy 
(Vol. 30, No. 2)
Krause and Milliken (2009)
Conflict, development, (in)security and 
violence in the 21st century
Third World Quarterly (Vol. 30, No. 1) Berger and Weber (2009)
Internal dynamics and external 
interventions
Peace Review (Vol. 21, No. 1) Clements (2009)
From the perspective of development agencies, there are case study volumes from the 
German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ, 2007b), 
and the World Bank (Manor, 2007). Both volumes provide practical examples and lessons 
learned from development projects in fragile states. Other case study work is based on 
the OECD’s efforts to evaluate the impact of the Paris Declaration. So far, specific studies 
include Afghanistan, Burundi, the DRC, Nepal, Indonesia, Guatemala, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, 
and Sudan (OPM and IDL, 2008; Stewart and Brown, 2009). A useful progression of these 
case studies would be the adoption of a similar conceptual framework in order to allow 
country comparisons (SDC, 2008, p. 16). The Paris Declaration progress indicators, as well 
as the guidance on evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities, could 
represent a valuable structure for case study research (OECD, 2005; OECD, 2008e).
By recognising the variety of contexts and characteristics of fragile states, the vast amount 
of existing case studies underline one of the ten Principles of the OECD – namely that 
it is essential for international actors to understand the specific context of each 
country (…). Sound political analysis is needed to adapt international responses to 
country and regional contexts, beyond quantitative indicators of conflict, governance 
or institutional strength (OECD, 2007a, p. 6).
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In terms of future research, this Principle points in the direction of qualitative case studies. 
While this would not exclude quantitative approaches – as research ultimately gains from 
the combination of different methods as long as these are transparently documented – 
there is much to gain from relating quantitative findings to a context-sensitive analysis 
(Krause and Jütersonke, 2007, p. 11). Such combinations of quantitative and qualitative 
research may be a basis for the ongoing monitoring in specific countries of the 
implementation progress of the Paris Declaration and the diagnostic needs for donor 
engagement in the field.
State formation in Europe
Having charted the ranking and case study evidence from fragile states, this section invites 
the reader to step back for a moment and reflect on the orthodoxies involved in current 
approaches to fragile states themselves. This section shows that there is no uniform view 
in the historical record of what an ideal state should look like, and how it came about and 
evolved over time. Despite modern reliance on the state, historical contributions on the 
subject of state formation suggest ‘most of human history has not been graced by the 
presence of states’ (Hall and Ikenberry 1989, p. 16). 
Overall, states are a relatively recent innovation to manage violence, structure political 
authority, and support economic development. The growth of states has been related to 
the tendencies of fragmentation and concentration of political authority. In late 15th century 
Europe, for example, there were allegedly 500 independent political units in Europe alone; 
these were then concentrated into 25 by 1900 (Leftwich, 2008, p. 212). Since then, there has 
been a progressive fragmentation of political authority as evidenced by the growing number 
of states globally. One estimate holds that there were 55 recognised state polities in 1914, 
a number that increased to 59 in 1919 after the end of the First World War and the 
disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (Rotberg, 2004, p. 2). The United Nations 
started with 51 Member States in 1945 and increased to 76 in 1955, 117 in 1965, 144 in 1975, 
159 in 1985, 185 in 1995, and 191 in 2005. The latest member of the United Nations is 
Montenegro, raising overall membership to 192 in 2006. Together with the Vatican, which 
is the only non-Member State with a permanent observer status, the total number of states 
is therefore 193 (United Nations, 2006). 
These figures emphasise that the state has been an evolving entity that has never been a 
completed project: ‘From the outset, the modern state represented an ideal of sovereign 
territoriality to which rulers aspired, but which they seldom achieved’ (Krause and Milliken, 
2002, pp. 753, 755). Processes resembling state-like structures have first been observed in 
Mesopotamia around 3,000 BC, then in the Greek city-states and the Roman res publica. In 
general state structures are said to have evolved in the transition from nomadic subsistence 
and hunting-gathering to agrarian societies: ‘(…) It was the relative geographical immobility 
of agricultural production that led to the development of the institutions and infrastructure 
capable of governing and projecting power (…) over a specific and delineated territory’ 
(Hay and Lister, 2006, p. 5). Manifestations of cohesive political units resembling states 
were observed in the pre-Colombian Americas, as well as in many territories in the Middle 
East, Central Asia, China, Japan, and India (Strayer, 1970, p. 12). In a sense, Europe was a 
relative latecomer to state-making. 
In Europe, states evolved during the Middle Ages between 1100 and 1600. As a result of 
the Investiture Conflict in the 11th century, the Church increasingly distinguished itself from 
lay governments, and thereby implicitly fostered a recognition that ‘the Church could not 
perform all political functions, [and] that lay rulers were necessary and had a sphere in 
which they should operate’ (Strayer, 1970, p. 22). Rulers thus came to have the primary 
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function to guarantee and distribute justice. Over time, these rulers realised that justice 
was not only good business as most penalties involved a payment, but that it was also a way 
to assert authority. In parallel, financial institutions grew out of the estate management 
needs of kings and princes. As general taxation was unknown in these times, their wealth 
depended on lands, tolls, market dues, and fines, and how effectively these could be 
collected. Revenue was centralised by those responsible for collecting these taxes – 
shire-reeves in England or the prévôts in France – and given to the ruler against a record 
of collected revenue over time. 
The essential attributes of the state began to appear between 1100 and 1300: 
Political entities, each with its own basic core of people and lands, gained legitimacy 
by enduring through generations. Permanent institutions for financial and judicial 
business were established. Groups of professional administrators were developed. 
A central coordination agency, the chancery, had emerged with a staff of highly 
trained clerks’ (Strayer, 1970, p. 34). 
From the perspective of medieval state-making, the attributes of a state have been related to 
the appearance of ‘political units persisting in time and fixed in space, the development of 
permanent, impersonal institutions, agreement on the need for an authority which can give 
final judgements, and acceptance of the idea that this authority should receive the basic 
loyalty of its subjects’ (Strayer, 1970, p.10). 
This version of state formation considered that judicial and financial institutions were at 
the outset of the modern state. Consequently, state formation is just as closely linked to 
the existence of a monopoly to dispense justice and extract taxes, as it is to the monopoly 
over the legitimate use of violence (Jütersonke, 2008). The state ‘was conceived principally 
as an instrument to impose law and order on groups and people’ (Van Creveld, 1999, 
p. 415). While war was the major occupation of rulers, these wars were fought by bands of 
fighters commanded by noblemen, and were mainly conducted through negotiation and 
not active fighting (Howard, 1976, pp. 4-7). In addition, the expenses for a permanent 
army were too high for medieval rulers. Early state-making in Europe concentrated on 
institutions for internal affairs, rather than be preoccupied about external security 
(Strayer, 1970, pp. 80-81, 86-87).16
It is important to note that armed force only became a main driver of state formation after 
the 16th century. However, this evolution was based on pre-existing state structures that 
had emerged during the Middle Ages. Postulates such as ‘war makes states and states make 
war’ emphasise the mutual supporting functions of state-making, war-making, protection, 
and extraction.17 These should, however, be considered in the context of the pre-existing 
monopolies over justice and taxation that fostered a new dynamic in state formation. 
Other elements that facilitated state formation in Europe were its geographic limitations 
to further expansion. The competition between state entities over territory and economic 
opportunities reinforced the development of states (Rasler and Thompson, 1989, 
pp. 18-19, 210).
Another feature of state formation was that not all states followed the same development 
trajectory. In England, for example, a relative centralised state could emerge between 
1100 and 1300 because provincial power holders were decimated by a number of foreign 
incursions, widely dispersed, and did not command a sufficient concentration of land or 
power to create autonomous administrations. Most landholdings and justice institutions 
were held by the king and as a result the emerging institutions would be royal institutions. 
In contrast, France was composed of a series of autonomous provinces that had to be reined 
into one state. Thus, rather than centralisation, French state-making included multilayered 
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administrative structures that were governed at the top level by representatives of the king, 
but with representatives from the provinces representing lower levels: ‘French methods 
did make it possible to create a state out of provinces and regions with widely divergent 
characteristics. And because most of the European states which eventually emerged were 
mosaic states like France, they tended to follow the French model’ (Strayer 1970, pp. 53, 
also pp. 36-37, 49-51).
The variation of state structures has also been explained by their underlying economic 
structure. Sea powers and land powers, for example, evolved differently. Given their 
reliance on trade, sea powers – like Venice, the United Provinces of the Netherlands, 
and England – were better at creating wealth and developing a commercialised economy, 
something which thus facilitated taxation. They were also mainly concerned with fighting 
off external rivals. This fostered a slimmer state, a smaller capacity to deal with domestic 
rivals, a dominance of trading interests in state policy, and a greater emphasis on 
technology and capital in state development. The control of the state by merchants led 
to a lower protection and overhead cost of the state. Land powers were characterised by 
their large population and ability to mobilise man power. The size of the army and the 
territorial reach of the state led to a bigger state administration and the maintenance of 
a feudal system to ensure domestic order. Overall, conservative players ensured their 
dominance in policy. Thus, in the case of France and Russia, the control of the state by 
bureaucrats contributed to a high cost of protection and state overheads to maximise 
salaries and other benefits (Rasler and Thompson, 1989, pp. 7, 23, 208). 
Despite all its different manifestations, the European state was such a successful strategy 
to gaining economic and political superiority within a specific territory, that it was soon 
implemented in non-European settings. One of the central elements of its success was the 
taming of violence in support of economic development: 
Specialists in the use of violence needed revenues to fight their wars; and those who 
prevailed were those who allied their political force with the economic fortunes of the 
towns. The result of this alliance was a new political and economic order, (…) one in 
which prosperity profitably coexisted with peace, and one in which coercion was used 
not for predation but rather to enhance the productive use of society’s resources 
(Bates, 2001, p.51). 
Another central element in the success of European states was the shifting of social 
organisation from mobilisation around kinship to mobilisation around interests. This shift 
allowed overcoming the organisational limitation associated to agrarian society, where 
capital formation occurred on the bases of kinship and not the market (Bates, 2001, 
pp. 31, 47-48). 
These illustrations of the historical evidence of the state suggest that an ideal state 
type – as it is assumed in current discussions about state fragility – never really existed. 
States were rarely ‘ideal’, but represented pragmatic compromises between rulers 
and interest groups. It also did not come about in a few years but rather, it took ‘four to 
five centuries for European states to overcome their weakness, to remedy their 
administrative deficiencies, and to bring lukewarm loyalty up to the white heat of 
nationalism’ (Strayer, 1970, p. 57). The disconnect between the historical record of state 
formation and current approaches to fragile states is remarkable (Woodward, 2006, p. 6). 
One consequence of such a disconnect has been that the focus on a specific state model 
prevented the recognition of additional entry points for development opportunities. 
These are located in the often messy and sometimes illiberal realities of the states 
categorized as ‘fragile’ today.
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The political and economic logics of state fragility
According to some accounts, fragile states have been characterised as dangerous, 
marginalised, and anarchic environments in which ‘vicious networks of criminality, 
violence and drugs feed on disenfranchised populations and uncontrolled territory’ 
(Ghani and Lockhart, 2008, p. 3; Rotberg, 2004, p. 5). In these situations, the state was 
replaced ‘by a jagged-glass pattern of city-states, shanty-states, nebulous and anarchic 
regionalisms’ (Kaplan, 2000, pp. 43-44). However, these perceptions do not account for the 
mechanisms that order the political and social relations of fragile states. Since these are 
very different from the expectations of Western observers, they often remain unrecognised 
or are simply labelled as ‘chaos’ (Duffield, 2000, p. 82). A functionalist perspective on state 
fragility helps to recognise that disorder can have political or economic logics. These orders 
derive from the history of African state formation, as well as from the process by which 
local elites adapted governance structures to local realities and external incentives and 
pressures (Chabal and Daloz, 1999, pp. 1-2). 
A central problem for African state formation was the projection of authority over 
inhospitable territories with a low population density. In Europe, border demarcation 
was the result of wars with external challenges. The development of the hinterland was 
often related to protecting the state’s riches from capture and therefore moving them 
further away from the border. These processes did not take place in pre-colonial Africa 
and it was only through colonialism that a state system with fixed borders was created. 
With decolonisation, the leaders of newly independent states claimed full sovereignty over 
distant hinterlands without ever having established full control. The fact that there was no 
external challenger also meant that there were no incentives to build taxation systems in 
order to defend the borders (Herbst, 2000, pp. 11, 74, 254). 
This mixture of incomplete control over the hinterlands and full claims to sovereignty has 
been one of the explanations of state fragility in Africa. It has also been underlying the 
incentive structures of state leaders: 
Where the ability of rulers to draw revenues from commodity exports or from 
great-power military aid has allowed them to bypass bargaining with their subject 
populations, large state edifices have grown in the absence of significant consent or 
support from the citizens. Lacking strong ties between particular state institutions 
and major social classes within the population, those states have become more 
vulnerable to forcible seizures of power and abrupt changes in the form of 
government (Tilly, 1992, pp. 207-208). 
The result of these processes was a weak base for state-society relations. Society viewed 
the state as a predator or oppressor, or was simply something that occurred somewhere far 
away that just happened to be in the same country. 
Thus, in contrast to the European experience of strong state-society relations as a basis for 
political authority, in Africa it evolved from indirect rule and the empowerment of elite 
networks during colonialism (Di John, 2008; pp. 23-24). Rapid decolonisation in the 1950s 
and 1960s fostered the spread of patronage politics in the absence of independent state 
bureaucracies (Chabal and Daloz, 1999, p. 5). In addition, political contests often involved 
winner-takes-all outcomes rather than accommodation or compromise with opponents or 
interest groups (Di John 2008, p. 27). In these circumstances, disorder became a political 
and economic instrument (Chabal and Daloz 1999, p. xix; Bayart et al., 1999). 
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The workings of such systems have been captured by the notion of ‘limited access orders’ 
(North et al., 2009). In these orders, authorities limit access to valuable political and 
economic opportunities. Such barriers-to-entry allow governments to create a credible 
commitment among elites not to fight each other because they are better off participating 
in a patrimonial network than by challenging the authorities violently. They also build a 
relationship with a larger constituency of supporters through the provision of protection, 
welfare and justice. The concept is contrasted to ‘open access orders’ that structure access 
to political and economic opportunities in competitive terms through markets, elections, 
and merit.
The difference been ‘limited’ and ‘open’ access orders frequently remains unrecognised by 
those intervening in fragile states. For instance, 
Development policies often fail because they try to transplant elements of the open 
access order – such as competition, markets, and democracy – directly into limited 
access orders. The reforms threaten the rent-creation that holds the society together 
and in many cases challenge the very logic on which the society is organised. Not 
surprisingly, the elite and many non-elites resist, sabotage, or subvert such reforms 
in limited access societies that are not ready for them (North et al., 2007, p. 5).
This example emphasises the need for a better recognition of the way in which political 
and economic orders are structured in fragile states. The next section reviews a series of 
contributions investigating the workings of sub-national governance arrangements. 
Sub-state governance arrangements and 
‘bottom-up’ statebuilding
The state’s inability or unwillingness to deliver justice or welfare services evenly to a 
population does not mean that these are not provided by someone else. In many contexts, 
state functions have been assumed by gangs, private networks, local militias, guerrilla 
armies, or customary authorities; this with the consequence of splintering countries into 
different zones of autonomy (Rapley, 2006, p. 95). Of course these actors create their 
own insecurities, but ‘partly due to their success in providing security, these sub-state 
groups often become the most legitimate political authority in areas that they control’ 
(Reno, 2008, p. 143). Thus ‘imperfectly effective state authority can viably and normatively 
coexist territorially with more localised non-state forms of social regulation’ (Rodgers, 2006, 
p. 317; O’Donnell, 1993, pp, 1358-1361). In recent years, such phenomena have received 
increasing scholarly attention as exemplified by the work on hybrid political orders, 
the mediated state, and pockets of effectiveness. 
Hybrid political orders have been characterised as places in which: 
Diverse and competing claims to power and logics of order co-exist, overlap and 
intertwine, namely the logic of the “formal” state, of the “informal” societal order, and 
of globalisation and associated fragmentation (…). In such an environment, the “state” 
does not have a privileged position as the political framework that provides security, 
welfare and representation; it has to share authority, legitimacy, and capacity with 
other structures’ (Boege et al., 2009, p. 24). 
Hybrid political orders emphasise that the Weberian state is just one of many forms of 
structuring order in a specific territory, and that these alternative governance arrangements 
can be a middle ground between socially-engineered statebuilding and state formation as 
an organic, but violent, process (Trota, 2000, pp. 253-254).
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The workings of such sub-national governance arrangements have been illustrated in case 
studies on West African states, Somalia, and Mozambique (Reno, 1998; Menkhaus, 2006; 
Buur and Kyed, 2007; Hagmann and Huehne, 2007; Bradbury, 2008). Somalia is especially 
telling because it is often considered as the best example of a collapsed state. But rather 
than complete anarchy, there are various levels of alternative governance mechanisms 
that have been described as a ‘mediated state’. In such a state, 
The government relies on partnership (or at least coexistence) with a diverse range 
of local intermediaries and rival sources of authority to provide core functions 
of public security, justice, and conflict management (…). Mediated states are 
intrinsically messy, contradictory, illiberal, and constantly renegotiated deals – 
not ideal choices for governments but often the best of bad options for weak states’ 
(Menkhaus, 2006, p. 78). 
The ‘mediated state’ highlights that when a ruler or government has little capacity to impose 
control over a given territory, existing power realities foster governance arrangements 
based on deal-making, cooption, and sub-contracting whatever local non-state authority is 
in power in a particular locality (Wennmann, 2009a, p. 1133). 
For much of the academic literature, the fact that the capacity of government in fragile 
states is not equally distributed across the country and held by ‘privatised, often sultanistic, 
circuits of power’ is certainly nothing new (O’Donnell, 1993, p. 1359). Indeed, areas with 
functioning state capacity have been called ‘pockets of effectiveness’. These are ‘public 
organisations that are reasonably effective in carrying out their functions and in serving 
some conception of the public good despite operating in an environment in which most 
public organisations are ineffective and subject to serious predation [or] patronage’ 
(Leonard, 2008, p. 8). 
Hybrid political orders, mediated states, and pockets of effectiveness can be important 
for development assistance in fragile states. They are forms of authority that often go 
unrecognised but show that something can work in fragile states, and that they follow a 
particular political or economic logic or order that, alas, does not always coincide with 
Western perceptions of the way a state or society should work. There may be much to 
gain for development policy from reaching out to these existing governance arrangements 
and recognising them as a policy opportunity. Rather than building parallel state structures 
that marginalise functioning structures already delivering protection, welfare and justice 
to local populations, donors should explore the implications of integrating them into a 
long-term transition process. The starting-point for statebuilding should, therefore, 
revolve around what is there rather that what should be or is not there; hence emphasising 
the need for assessments of strengths rather than weaknesses.
While most interventions into fragile states have rested on a ‘top-down’ approach that 
purposefully imposes a specific state model, less attention has been given to a ‘bottom-up’ 
approach that nurtures the fusion of traditional and new governance components through 
a progressive transformation process. Such a process needs to be accompanied by constant 
negotiations that continuously renew transitional pacts between the main stakeholders. 
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New research perspectives on aid 
effectiveness in fragile states
Research on state fragility is an evolving field that cuts across many scholarly disciplines and the multiple priorities that inform donor policy. The previous sections have shown how the discourse on fragile states evolved after the end 
of the Cold War, opening a policy space to transform development practice into a holistic 
endeavour that addresses poverty, security, and statebuilding. In the course of two 
decades, development assistance has also become recognised to represent a 
political process. 
The different intellectual traditions underlying the literatures on fragile states reflect a 
tremendous variety of research efforts, and defy easy categorisation. Overall, the review 
emphasised that more attention has focused on ‘top-down’ rather than ‘bottom-up’ 
approaches to statebuilding, and that analyses of state fragility tended to highlight the 
weaknesses of fragile states rather than their strengths. A better understanding of these 
strengths could form a new evidence base for development engagements in specific 
contexts. Moreover, the disconnect between ‘top-down’ statebuilding approaches and the 
historical record of state formation in Europe highlights that expectations in statebuilding 
may need to be adjusted. Recognising alternative forms of political authority may 
strengthen aid effectiveness, local ownership, and state-society relations.
This part draws on these findings in order to propose a series of research themes on 
development assistance in fragile states and conflict situations. It starts by exploring 
the knowledge requirements necessary for the adoption of a ‘bottom-up’ approach to 
statebuilding. Topics discussed include the implications of adjusting expectations in 
statebuilding and delivering aid at the sub-national level, as well as improving aid 
effectiveness in the context of war-to-peace transitions and through mediation support. 
The sections also highlight the need for research to have a better understanding of the 
linkages between armed violence and development.
Adjusting expectations in statebuilding
There is a widespread belief today that it is possible to create a functioning state through 
externally driven processes in just a few decades, and that this state is a solution for armed 
violence, poverty, and disease. However, such expectations do not reflect the past record of 
state formation and may even suggest that ‘donors have consistently been unrealistic about 
the capacity required to manage complex processes of change’ (Centre for the Future State, 
2005, p. 1). Reforming a country’s civil service, for example, is so complex and difficult 
that ‘it should not be attempted at all – save in rare, very propitious circumstances’ 
(Leonard, 2008, p. 7). Statebuilding in Afghanistan and Iraq illustrates these observations 
only too well and underlines the limits of such endeavours in the context of an ongoing 
war (Felbab-Brown, 2009; Williams, 2009).
These observations suggest that it is timely to step back, evaluate lessons, and review 
expectations in statebuilding. Such a reassessment would involve rethinking the merits of 
the current ‘top-down’ statebuilding consensus that focuses on formal state institutions and 
compares these globally in fragility indices. The result is a ‘weakness’ analysis that captures 
what is missing rather than what is there. In contrast, country studies should explore the 
existing strengths of traditional and local governance arrangements, as well as their roles in 
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delivering state services to populations. On the one hand, the task is to review expectations 
in past statebuilding projects; on the other, it is to define what can be pragmatically 
expected in specific contexts from ‘bottom-up’ statebuilding. 
Aid delivery at the sub-national level
State fragility is not an absolute but a relative condition. There are various alternative 
sources of political authority in many fragile states that can provide security, welfare and 
justice. Diagnostic tools such as political economy or drivers of change analyses may be able 
to account for these actors at the sub-state level (DFID, 2009b; Dahl-Østergaard et al., 2005). 
These types of analyses contribute to the mapping of existing strengths at the sub-national 
level as well as to locating new entry points for development assistance. Potential practical 
advantages include a more direct access to violence or poverty affected populations; the 
valorisation of existing governance arrangements and capacities; and the strengthening of 
local ownership. The implications of recognising informal political authority figures or 
customary institutions as opportunities for aid effectiveness requires further investigation.
However, implementing such a perspective is far from easy. Policy-makers face the difficult 
choice of ‘accepting that for the sake of peace, stability, and progressive change deals may 
have to be struck, or allowed to be struck, that confound expectations of good governance 
or good policy’ (Cramer, 2009, pp. 139-140). While co-opting what some call ‘criminals’ or 
many consider ‘warlords’ may be deemed unacceptable, such deals could form the basis 
for transitional pacts, political settlements, violence reduction, and development. Thus, 
engagement of these actors may harness their locally-perceived legitimacy, as well as 
networks and money to support development transitions. 
At the same time, donors need to strengthen their capacity to deal with the political 
consequences entailed by such an approach. Engaging alternative political authorities does 
not mean to romanticise them. They can play a positive role in specific contexts, but have 
multiple faces and sometimes use coercive means to go about their business (Cockayne 
and Lupel, 2009, p. 153). The challenge is to make them support – or at least tolerate – 
a development transition in the region that they control, instead of using their powers to 
undermine it.
Enhancing aid effectiveness in war-to-peace transitions
War-to-peace transitions are composed of various overlapping phases including the 
engagement of armed groups in a peace process, the resolution or transformation of violent 
disputes, and the establishment of a lasting peace. The role of donors is important in these 
transitions. They are often the only actors with a prolonged presence in a country slipping 
into conflict, and can thus actively engage in its transformation and facilitate alternative 
economic futures that make post-conflict realities worthwhile for ex-combatants and 
civilian populations (SDC, 2008, pp. 8-10). In order to increase aid effectiveness in war-to-
peace transitions, the development community must recognise its comparative advantage in 
peace processes. For instance, it can adjust expectations on expected peace dividends, 
facilitate dialogue and build confidence, and offer quick impact or long-term development 
programming (OECD, 2001, pp. 51-52; Brown and Grävingholt, 2009). 
Despite these potential benefits, the involvement in peace processes is often perceived by 
donors as beyond their mandate. Many follow the line that engagement in a conflict country 
is conditional on a signed peace agreement. However, when a peace agreement has been 
signed it is often too late to influence the conditions that could facilitate post-conflict 
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economic recovery. The case of Liberia exemplified that the internally-brokered peace 
process provided an unprecedented opportunity for external intervention in a sovereign 
state (Dwan and Bailey, 2006, p. 23). A better understanding of the institutional limitations 
of donors to engage in war-to-peace transitions would therefore be an important first step to 
further exploration of how the strategic engagement of donors in peace processes can assist 
in the task of increasing aid effectiveness and laying the foundations for a lasting peace. 
Aid effectiveness through mediation support
While there is an emerging support infrastructure for peace negotiations, there is little 
-if any- support capacity that ensures negotiations are ongoing after a conflict. At present, 
mediation is mainly perceived as a strategy to find a negotiated exit out of a conflict. 
However, the need to support new transitional pacts when peace agreements are 
implemented is well known, but still too little is done in practice to support them. 
Nepal, for example, shows the importance of mediation support to bring an end to 
conflict, but also to assist the political processes in the aftermath of the war that shaped 
the country’s political and economic prospects (Wennmann, 2009b, pp.17-18).
There is a growing recognition of the potential of mediation outside its traditional role 
in conflict resolution. The OECD highlighted the role of mediation in strengthening the 
resilience capacity of states through stronger state-society relations. Important elements 
include supporting dialogue processes between civil society, the private sector, and state 
institutions (OECD, 2008a, pp. 27-29; Paffenholz and Spurk, 2006; Bignon and Korf, 2004). 
Mediation support activities may also prevent armed violence and therefore its negative 
development consequences. Early engagement in Ghana helped transform local disputes 
into processes of ‘normal’ politics, and thereby successfully prevented violence during the 
2008 elections (UNDPA, 2009, p. 16-17). Mediation has also strengthened private sector 
investment in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where between 2004 and 2006 local mediators 
resolved disputes between companies and thereby facilitated the release of investments 
worth eight million Euro (IFC, 2008, p. 2).
These examples illustrate the potential gains of mediation support activities for aid 
effectiveness. Identifying the value-added of current mediation practices provides important 
insights into strengthening political accords and economic conditions in war-to-peace 
transitions.
Securing development through armed violence reduction
Timely investments into armed violence reduction represent an opportunity for aid 
effectiveness (OECD, 2009, p.15). Armed violence has tremendous human and economic 
costs that undermine past development achievements and their future prospects. The 
OECD, UNDP, the World Bank, and the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and 
Development attempt to identify the mechanisms by which armed violence reduction 
becomes a development multiplier in fragile and conflict contexts in various ways (OECD, 
2009; UNDP, 2008; Skaperdas et al., 2009; Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2008). Current 
research initiatives map the global and sub-national distribution and the cost of armed 
violence, and establish detailed armed violence assessments in specific countries such as 
Burundi (Pézard and de Tessières, 2009). 
As the research agenda on armed violence reduction unfolds, the available evidence base 
on the relationship between armed violence and development will become richer (Muggah 
and Krause, 2009). A particular contribution would be to develop a greater clarity on the 
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mechanisms that link armed violence to lower levels of development, and what this means 
in specific local contexts. For example, better information on the distribution and 
magnitude of the cost of armed violence at the municipal level could assist in creating 
constituencies for armed violence reduction. In addition, a better grasp of armed violence 
reduction programmes may offer insights into the necessary multi-stakeholder coalitions 
between national and municipal authorities, the business community, local communities, 
and donors that can forge a lasting end of violence and strengthen economic prospects.
Concluding comments: 
Towards context-sensitivity and coordination
In conclusion, there are two additional points that deserve to be highlighted. The first is 
the need for more context-sensitive analyses that inform local development transitions. 
The 2007 Principles emphasised that understanding the context of development interventions 
is essential for the international community to assist fragile states. This is a request to 
the research community for more field research and collaboration with local researchers. 
It highlights that conceptual innovations must be translated into local contexts. The 
research tools to implement these analyses include household surveys, focus groups, and 
semi-structured interviews with key informants, and usually involve research teams 
composed of local and international researchers from various backgrounds. Thus, the issue 
is not the validity of one or the other methodology, but rather the creation of knowledge as 
a joint process, and making it directly relevant for the people that have to drive the political 
processes behind development. 
The second point is that development transitions are never the outcome of a single actor, be 
it national or international. The review underlined the inherent complexity of engineering 
change and the clear need to coordinate efforts, identify and use synergies, and allow others 
to be in the driving seat if they are actually better placed to deliver the assistance needed. In 
recent years, there has been an increasing bilateral interest in whole-of-systems approaches 
and an evolving consensus that statebuilding is an endogenous and locally driven process 
that the international community merely nurtures and supports. While these efforts are 
encouraging, there is much work ahead to transform these trends into standard 
development practice, and identify appropriate entry-points for integrated approaches. The 
way donors will deal with their own risk adversity and attitude towards competition with 
each other will be an important component in advancing efforts to structure development 
assistance in a coherent, coordinated, and complementary fashion.
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Annex: Selected institutions 
conducting research on fragile states
Bertelsmann Foundation, Gütersloh, Germany: The Bertelsmann Foundations maintains 
the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) that compares and ranks the political 
management and progress towards democracy and market economy of 125 countries. 
The BTI is a biannual product and so far exists for the years 2003, 2006, and 2008. It also 
publishes country reports that use a standardised framework to detail specific country 
challenges, and compare advances of reform processes. The results are presented visually 
in the Transformation Atlas. Website: http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de.
Centre for the Future States, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton, United Kingdom: 
The Centre links researchers from the Institute with a network of partner organisations and 
collaborators from Africa, Latin America, South and Southeast Asia, China and Egypt. A first 
phase covered the period 2000-2005, and a second phase runs until 2010. The Centre has the 
objectives to undertake, disseminate, and mainstream new research on key issues relating 
to the future of public authority in developing countries, and foster research inputs from 
developing countries. Publications are structured along six themes: aid and international 
dimensions of governance, collective action and political representation, public action and 
private investment, public service delivery, state capacity, and tax revenue and public 
finance. Website: http://www2.ids.ac.uk/futurestate/general/index.html.
Centre for International Development and Conflict Management, University of 
Maryland, USA: The Centre produces the PCIL that so far appeared for the years 2003, 
2005, 2008, and 2010. Every two years, it tracks the trends in armed conflict, 
democratization, and instability for 160 countries and focuses on a specific topic such 
as the challenges of post-conflict transitions in the 2010 edition. The PCIL uses a series 
of indicators on regime consistency, infant mortality, economic openness, militarisation, 
and neighbourhood wars. Website: http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/pc.
Country Indicators for Foreign Policy, Carlton University, Ottawa, Canada: The CIFP include 
three main research streams including a conflict risk assessment, governance and democracy 
processes, and failed and fragile states. CIFP Fragile States reports are based on six clusters of 
indicators relating to governance, economics, security and crime, human development, 
demography, and environment. Overall, country reports include up to 75 separate structural 
indicators for a detailed quantitative assessment. Website: http://www.carleton.ca/cifp.
Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics, London, United Kingdom: 
The Crisis States Research Centre was launched in 2001 and completed its first research cycle 
in 2005.  The Centre has now nearly completed its second phase for the period 2006 to 2010. 
In the first phase, the project produced 81 working papers, in the second phase there are so 
far 71 working papers that are related to the three interlinked themes: development and state-
making, cities and fragile states, regional and global axes of conflict. Both phases include a rich 
collection of case studies, some also at the city level. Website: http://www.crisisstates.com.
Index of State Weakness in the Developing World, Brookings Institution, Washington 
D.C., USA: The ISW was designed to provide policy-makers and researchers with a 
credible tool for analyzing and understanding the world’s most vulnerable countries. 
The Index ranks and assesses 141 developing nations according to their relative 
performance in four critical spheres: economic, political, security and social welfare. 
Website: http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2008/02_weak_states_index.aspx.
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Institute for Development and Peace, University Duisburg-Essen, Duisburg, Germany: 
Research at the Institute is structured along three research areas that include global 
governance and human security, violent conflicts and peace strategies, and development 
and human rights. Under these general research streams the Institute has specific research 
projects on development assistance in fragile states with a focus on development policy 
under conditions of globalisation, successful and failed nation-building in the Third World, 
and regime type and the collapse of state institutions. Website: http://inef.uni-due.de.
Fund For Peace, Washington D.C., USA: The Fund For Peace produces the annual FSI. 
The Index is based on risk indicators and uses specific software to process thousands of 
articles and reports. The Index is constructed around three types of indicators. Social 
indicators include mounting demographic pressures; massive movement of refugees or 
internally displaced persons; legacy of vengeance-seeking group grievance or group 
paranoia, and chronic and sustained human flight. Economic indicators include uneven 
economic development along group lines and severe economic decline. Political indicators 
are criminalisation of states, progressive deterioration of public services, suspension or 
arbitrary application of the rule of law and widespread violation of human rights, legitimacy 
of security actors, the existence of factionalised elites, and intervention of other states or 
external actors. Website: http://www.fundforpeace.org.
Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit, University of York, United Kingdom: 
The Unit is part of the Fragile States Development Consortium (FSDC) and leads the 
Social Development Framework Agreement that manages consultancy needs for various 
government institutions in the United Kingdom and leading development agencies. 
The FSDC is an international partnership of research and consultancy organisations that 
combine their expertise for technical assessments, programme design and implementation, 
training, technical assistance and policy work in conflict-affected environments, and 
extensive social development work. It maintains a global networks of consultants and 
was previously known as the United Kingdom’s Post-conflict Reconstruction Unit. 
Website: http://www.york.ac.uk/depts/poli/prdu/fragile/index.htm.
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